A number of observers have advocated recently that the Federal Reserve take an \op-portunistic" approach to the conduct of monetary policy. A hallmark of this approach is that the central bank focuses on ghting in ation when in ation is high, but focuses on stabilizing output when in ation is low. The implied policy rule is nonlinear. This paper compares the behavior of in ation and output under opportunistic and conventional linear policies. Using stochastic simulations of a small-scale rational expectations model, we study the cost and time required to achieve a given disin ation, as well as the steady-state distributions of in ation and output under the various rules.
Introduction
During the past 15 years or so, in ation has declined substantially in the United States, from more than 11 percent in 1980 to roughly 3 percent in each of the last few years. 1 When in ation is high, as it was at the beginning of this period, the consensus in favor of deliberate anti-in ationary action on the part of the central bank is very strong, notwithstanding the substantial associated cost in terms of lost output and employment. But when in ation is low, as is currently the case, the consensus for deliberate anti-in ationary action is less overwhelming.
A conventional view regarding the conduct of monetary policy is that a central bank should balance the objective of achieving and maintaining low in ation against the objective of stabilizing real activity around its sustainable level, and that the tradeo between the two objectives should be roughly linear. This approach to policy determination implies, for example, that if the current rate of in ation is 3 percent and the target rate is less than 3 percent, the central bank should attempt to shade the economy toward operating a bit below its potential, in order to put downward pressure on in ation.
Recently, an alternative viewpoint has emerged. Adherents of this viewpoint argue that when in ation is low but still above the long-run objective, the monetary authority should focus exclusively on output and employment stabilization, and not worry about deliberately inducing any reduction in in ation. When disin ation occurs (perhaps because a favorable supply shock has occurred or an unanticipated demand-induced recession has taken place), the central bank should consolidate the gain, and|if necessary|move to stabilize output at potential. This alternative strategy has come to be known as \the opportunistic approach to disin ation."
A previous paper (Orphanides and Wilcox 1996] ) examined possible theoretical rationales for the opportunistic approach. The primary objective of this paper is to compare the behavior of key macroeconomic variables under conventional and opportunistic policies, 1 CPI-U, all items, 1983 forward; CPI-U-X1, which \backcasts" the measurement of homeowners' costs on a rental equivalence basis, 1980-83. using stochastic simulations of a small-scale rational expectations model which we built for this purpose. We also provide some information on the performance of rules that attempt to con ne in ation within a target zone. In our macro model, monetary policy has real e ects because workers and rms sign long-term contracts. The model is large enough to provide a realistic description of some of the most basic features of the U.S. economy, and yet small enough to make stochastic simulations relatively convenient.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a more complete description of the opportunistic approach to disin ation, and contrast it with a more conventional approach. Section 3 describes the macroeconometric model we use as a laboratory for our comparisons. Section 4 uses some simple simulations to illuminate the di erences between the opportunistic and conventional rules. In each of these simulations, the model is subjected to only one type of shock|for example, a shock to the contract wage equation or to aggregate demand. Section 5 conducts stochastic simulations using shocks to all behavioral equations in the model. We use these simulations to estimate probability distributions over the time required under each of the various rules to achieve price stability. We also calculate the distributions of in ation and the output gap in the stochastic steady state|that is, once the transition to price stability has been completed. Section 6 concludes.
Conventional and opportunistic decision rules
Much of the recent literature on monetary policy rules assumes that the policymaker wishes to stabilize output around potential and in ation around a long-run target. In the long run, there is no con ict between these objectives provided the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. At any given moment, however, they are in tension with one another. Henderson and McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993b) propose to resolve this tension using a reaction function of the following form: is the short-term nominal interest rate (the monetary authority's policy instrument), r is the equilibrium short-term real interest rate (that is, the short-term real interest rate consistent with output being at potential), y is the output gap (measured as log actual output/potential output]), is the rate of in ation, is the policymaker's long-run target for in ation, and 1 and 2 are positive parameters. We refer to policymakers with linear decision rules of this class as \conventional."
We operationalize this rule for use with quarterly data by assuming that the policymaker reacts to the lagged output gap (y t?1 ) and the lagged four-quarter in ation rate ( t?1 p t?1 ?p t?5 , where p denotes the log of the price level). With these modi cations, we rewrite the conventional decision rule as: (1) Following Taylor (1993b), we set both r and at 2 percent.
Equation (1) re ects the conventional view that both the in ation gap and the output gap should always in uence the choice of policy stance. 2 An opportunistic policymaker does not subscribe to this view. On the contrary, she focuses on di erent objectives depending on the level of in ation: When in ation is high, she focuses on ghting in ation, but when in ation is low, she focuses on stabilizing output. Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) (4) where~ is an intermediate target, which is calculated as a weighted average of the longrun target and the inherited rate of in ation ( y t ). The latter is simply taken to be a backward-looking moving average of actual in ation.
The rst three terms on the right-hand sides of equations (1) and (2) are identical. The only di erence between the two speci cations is in the reaction to deviations of in ation from target; here, there are two key di erences. First, while the conventional policymaker reacts to the gap between actual in ation and her long-run in ation target, the opportunistic policymaker reacts to the gap between actual in ation and an intermediate target. Second, while the conventional policymaker responds to the in ation gap in a linear manner, the opportunistic policymaker's reaction to the gap between actual in ation and the intermediate target is nonlinear. If the discrepancy between lagged in ation and the intermediate target does not exceed a certain tolerance level (denoted as ), she sets the in ation penalty equal to 0. If the discrepancy exceeds , she adjusts the interest rate by 3 percentage points for each percentage point of excess discrepancy. We refer to the range in which the opportunistic policymaker sets the in ation penalty to zero as the \zone of opportunism."
In the simulation exercises we conduct below, we focus mainly on two versions of the conventional linear speci cation given in equation (1) and one version of the opportunistic rule. The rst version of the linear speci cation we simulate is Taylor's (1993b) rule, which we obtain by setting 1 and 2 equal to 0.5. The second version of the linear speci cation is a rule that was proposed by Henderson and McKibbin (1993) ; we obtain this rule by setting 1 equal to 2 and 2 equal to 1. Thus, the Henderson-McKibbin rule is more aggressive than the Taylor rule in combating both output gaps and in ation gaps, but more so with respect to output gaps than with respect to in ation gaps.
We calibrate the opportunistic rule as follows: We set the coe cient on the lagged output gap in the opportunistic rule at 2, and the slope of the in ation penalty function outside the zone of opportunism at 2.5. The penalty on output gaps is the same as in Henderson-McKibbin, while the penalty on in ation outside the zone of opportunism is considerably sti er than the marginal penalty on in ation in Henderson-McKibbin. Our interest in calibrating the opportunistic rule relative to some speci c conventional rule was motivated by results presented in Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) to the e ect that optimizing conventional and opportunistic policymakers, confronted with the same economic environment, will choose closely related parameter settings. In the simple model Orphanides and Wilcox analyzed, the opportunistic policymaker chooses the same coe cient on the output gap as does the conventional policymaker, and sets a sti er marginal penalty on in ation outside the zone of opportunism, consistent with our choices here. Our decision to maximize comparability speci cally with the Henderson-McKibbin rule was motivated by the results reported in Levin (1996) and Brayton et al. (1996) , as well as in Henderson and McKibbin (1993) , to the e ect that rules with more aggressive response coe cients than those in Taylor's rule seem to deliver better macroeconomic performance in at least some models. 4 Figure 1 compares the opportunist's penalty on in ation, f (:), with the penalties imposed by the two conventional policymakers. We show the deviation of in ation from target on the horizontal axis, and the implied increment to the short-term nominal rate on the vertical axis. The Taylor penalty function is shown with the dotted line, the HendersonMcKibbin with the dashed line, and the opportunistic with the solid line. (In superimposing the opportunistic penalty on top of the conventional ones, we are implicitly assuming that inherited in ation|and thus the intermediate target|are both equal to the long-run target.) The gure highlights that the opportunist behaves quite di erently than either 4 Henderson-McKibbin implies a much stronger response to output deviations than does Taylor. In most macroeconometric models, real output exhibits a relatively high degree of inertia, so that a high partial interest-rate elasticity with respect to output deviations can be expected to generate greater output stability. Two other minor notes on numerical assignment of parameter values for the opportunistic rule: We set equal to 1 =3, and thus put relatively more weight on the long-run target in the determination of the intermediate target. Also, we set equal to 1 percentage point; as a result, the zone of opportunism, which is centered on the intermediate target, has an overall width of 2 percentage points. conventionalist: Whereas the conventionalists lean against in ation at least to some extent whenever current in ation deviates from the long-run target, the opportunist in this specication makes essentially no e ort to move in ation closer to the intermediate target when the in ation gap is already small.
Although we devote the bulk of our attention to the three policy rules described above, towards the end of the paper we also present some results for three rules that can be interpreted as variations on the opportunistic theme. The rst variation recognizes the in uence that uncertainty about the location of the aggregate demand curve might have on the behavior of the opportunist. Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) argued that an opportunistic policymaker who took this type of uncertainty seriously would behave a bit more like the conventionalist than is suggested by Figure 1 . Although the penalty function would remain atter inside the zone of opportunism than outside, it would not be literally horizontal. In other words, the opportunist would expect to make some progress toward the long-run in ation objective even if in ation were already close to the target. Analytical derivation of a decision rule that allows for this type of uncertainty is di cult or impossible in a model as complex the one we describe below, so we approximate what we presume to be the actual shape of such a decision rule using a function that has the slope of the Taylor rule (0.5) inside the zone of opportunism, and the slope of the baseline opportunistic speci cation outside the zone of opportunism.
The other two variations are motivated by the recent literature on the concept of in ation targeting (see, for example, Leiderman and Svensson (1995) , Svensson (1996) ), as well as the rhetoric and actions of several central banks around the world (e.g., Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) which tend to emphasize containing in ation within a target zone rather than con ning it to a point (see Table 1 in Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) ). In a mechanical sense, these variations can be derived from the opportunistic rule by xing the intermediate target at the long-run target. Again, we consider two possibilities for the case in which in ation is close to the target: one in which the response function is at and the other in which the response function is moderately sloped. The at version might be most appropriate for a \zoner" who could control output perfectly, while the sloped version might be more appropriate for a zoner who exercises imperfect control over output.
We close this section with a technical note related to the algorithm we use to simulate the model with each of the policy rules. If this algorithm were fully satisfactory, the conditional expectation of in ation E t t+N would depend on the variances of the various shocks in the model when the policymaker is using the opportunistic rule. (The issue we are addressing here is not relevant when the policymaker is using a linear rule.) If at least some of those variances are positive, the conditional expectation would converge to as N goes to in nity because economic agents would expect the opportunistic policymaker to react asymmetrically to future shocks, leaning against the unfavorable ones and accommodating the favorable ones. Given forward-looking behavior in wage setting, such expectations would drive the expectation of in ation to the long-run target. Moreover, the speed of convergence would depend on the variance of the various shocks in the model (larger variances being associated with a more rapid convergence of the conditional expectation to the long-run target). On the other hand, if the variances of all shocks in the model were zero, the limit of the conditional expectation would depend on initial conditions, but would not, in general, equal . For example, if in ation initially were above but still within the zone of opportunism and the model were otherwise in equilibrium, in ation would simply remain at its initial level.
Unfortunately, the simulation algorithm we have been using does not produce exactly these results. In fact, this algorithm causes the conditional expectations of all the state variables in the model to converge to user-speci ed terminal conditions, regardless of the variances of the shocks in the model. This obviously creates an uncomfortable internal inconsistency if the variances of the shocks in the model are declared to be zero: the conditional expectation of in ation converges to the long-run target even when it should not. We resolve this tension by using the following approximation to equation (4) 
The function g(:) is continuously di erentiable, and has a tiny bit of positive slope even when in ation is close to the intermediate target. That slope rationalizes the convergence of the conditional expectation of in ation to the long-run target even when the variance of future shocks is set equal to zero. This is, in fact, the function that is plotted in Figure 1 ; as can be seen there, the slope of the function inside the zone of opportunism is very slight, even though non-zero.
To be clear, we should emphasize that the variance of shocks in principle has both a direct and an indirect e ect on the results. The direct e ect is that a greater variance of shocks gives the opportunistic policymaker greater scope for asymmetric behavior. The indirect e ect is that all agents (private as well as public) should be taking this into account when they form their expectations. The simulation algorithm we are currently using captures the direct e ect but not the indirect one.
There are other solution algorithms for nonlinear rational expectations models available that do not impose certainty equivalence, but these alternative algorithms would be prohibitively costly to use with the current model given the large number of state variables therein. In future work with a much smaller model, we intend to explore the quantitative importance of the indirect e ects.
A small model of the U.S. economy with rational expectations
This section describes the model that we use as a laboratory for the comparison of the rules described above. The main features of this model are that it accounts for the forwardlooking behavior of economic agents, and that it is small enough to be usable for stochastic simulation studies of alternative policy rules. Monetary policy has temporary real e ects in this model because wage contracts are staggered in the manner of Taylor (1980) . The model is essentially a one-country version of the multi-country model which is presented and used for policy analysis in Taylor (1993a) . A version of the model has been used by Taylor and Williams (1993) in a study of forecasting with rational expectations models. We alter the Taylor-Williams speci cation of the wage-price sector by following Moore (1995a, 1995b) in assuming that workers and rms set the real wage in the rst period of each new contract with an eye toward the real wage agreed upon in the rst period of other contracts signed in the recent past and expected to be signed in the near future. 5 As Fuhrer and Moore show, models speci ed in this manner exhibit a greater (and hence more realistic) degree of in ation persistence than do models in which workers and rms care about relative wages in nominal terms. We use the parameter values that were estimated by Taylor and Williams (1993) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) , and we simulate the model using a very e cient algorithm that was recently implemented in TROLL based on work by Boucekkine (1995) , Juillard (1994) and La argue (1990).
Expectations of endogenous variables are formed rationally in our simulations, given the maintained assumption of certainty equivalence. Consequently, the simulations are immune to the Lucas Critique. In particular, agents' expectations fully re ect the choice of monetary rule. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) take a similar approach using a model that is more explicitly grounded than ours in speci c optimization problems confronted by rms, households, and policymakers. We note, however, that their model may be of only limited usefulness for the type of analysis we wish to undertake here because its parameters are calibrated rather than estimated.
The model is a simple linear ow model of the economy. We group the various equations under three headings: interest rates, aggregate demand, and the wage-price sector.
Interest rates
Three equations determine the various interest rates in the model. A policy rule determines the short-term nominal rate; a term-structure equation determines the long-term nominal rate; and a version of Fisher's equation determines the long-term real rate. We consider three di erent speci cations of the policy rule: (a) an opportunistic rule, (b) Henderson Normalized consumption is modeled as a function of its own lagged value, permanent income, and the expected long-term real interest rate. The lagged dependent variable can be rationalized as re ecting a cost to changing consumption. Permanent income is the annuity value of expected income in the current and next eight periods. The investment equations are (nearly) of the accelerator type. Net exports depend on the level of income at home and abroad (y w t ), and on the real exchange rate (e t ). Government spending follows a simple autoregressive process, with a near-unit root. All these equations are estimated in Taylor and Williams (1993) using GMM. Following Taylor and Williams, we hold foreign output and the real exchange rate constant in our simulations. 6 6 In future work, we intend to investigate whether we can bring into the model a slightly more realistic description of scal policy: As Taylor (1995) shows, the federal de cit is strongly countercyclical. This key feature is absent from the speci cation given above.
Wages and Prices
The wage-price block consists of two equations that determine the real wage to be paid in the current quarter under newly-signed contracts, and a markup equation determining the price in the current period. (11) Equations (11) and (12) specify that the real wage under contracts signed in the current period is set in reference to a centered moving average of initial-period real wages established under contracts signed as many as three quarters earlier as well as contracts to be signed as many as three quarters ahead. The real wage also depends on expected excess-demand conditions. Once contracts are signed, they remain in force for up to four quarters. As a result, the aggregate price p t is a weighted average of the nominal wages that were negotiated in the current and previous three quarters (and thus that remain in force), with the weights re ecting the proportion of contracts outstanding from each quarter. Full-information maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters in the wage-price block are taken from Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) .
The steady state of the model
In the steady state of this model, output is at potential, and the sectoral allocation of GDP is constant. Because we hold rest-of-world output and the real exchange rate constant, these conditions de ne a unique steady-state value of the long-term real interest rate. Taylor and Williams adjusted the intercept in the consumption equation so that the steady-state long-term real interest rate would be 4 percent. 7 Given the adjustment to the intercept in the consumption equation and the resulting 4 percent equilibrium long-term real rate, the steady-state consumption share is 66.5 percent, the xed investment share is 15.6 percent, the inventory investment share is 0.4 percent, the net exports share is -1 percent, and the government spending share is 18.5 percent. The dynamic properties of the model are not sensitive to the calibration of the steady state.
The steady-state value of in ation is determined exclusively by the policymaker's reaction function; the wage-price block does not impose any restriction on the steady-state in ation rate. These conditions guarantee that the steady-state in ation rate will be under all three of the rules we simulate.
Opportunism versus conventional policy: some illustrative examples
This section uses some simple simulations to illustrate the behavior of the model under each of the three decision rules described above. In each of these simulations, we either shut down all shocks completely, or we subject the model to only one type of shock (for example, an adverse supply shock or a negative shock to aggregate demand). In the next section of the paper, we consider simulations involving repeated shocks to all equations in the model.
Disin ation in the absence of shocks
We begin by examining the behavior of the model when the initial in ation rate is 4 percent (i.e., 2 percentage points above the long-run target) and there are no shocks to the economy during the simulation. 8 Figure 2 summarizes the results. The top-left panel shows the 7
In the unadjusted model, according to Taylor and Williams, the steady-state long-term real interest rate is 7 percent. trajectory of in ation over the simulation period for each of the three policy rules, while the top right panel shows in ation under the opportunistic rule relative to the zone of opportunism. The middle panel shows the evolution of the output gap, while the bottom panel shows the path of the short-term nominal interest rate. In each panel, the data pertaining to the Taylor rule are shown with a solid line; those for the Henderson-McKibbin rule are shown with a dashed line, and those for the opportunistic rule are shown with a dotted line.
With the in ation rate initially at 4 percent, the Taylor-type policymaker sets the shortterm nominal interest rate at 7 percent (2 percent for the real rate, 4 percent for the in ation rate, and 1 percent for the excess of in ation over the long-term target). This level of the nominal interest rate is su cient to drive output nearly 3 = 4 percent below potential after three quarters. In turn, this slack is su cient to put in ation on a downward trajectory. After about three years, in ation has reached 3 percent|halfway to the long-run target|and output has returned about two-thirds of the way to potential. This policymaker perseveres in the ght against in ation, and eventually drives in ation down to its target of 2 percent.
The Henderson-McKibbin policymaker puts the nominal short-term rate at the start of the simulation at 8 percent (2 percent for the real rate, 4 percent for the prevailing in ation rate, and 2 percent for the excess of in ation over the long-run target). The resulting recession is only a bit deeper and more longer-lived, however, because the HendersonMcKibbin policymaker cuts the nominal rate quite aggressively once an output gap opens up. In ation comes down slightly more rapidly under the Henderson-McKibbin rule than under the Taylor rule.
The opportunistic policymaker puts the short-term nominal rate at 6-2 = 3 percent at the start of the simulation, only slightly below the rate set under Taylor's rule. This level of the short-term rate re ects the following calculations on the part of the opportunist: With the long-run target set at 2 percent, an inherited rate of 4 percent, and a of 1 = 3 , the opportunist sets the intermediate target at 2-2 = 3 percent. And with a of 1 percent, the upper boundary of the zone of opportunism is 3-2 = 3 percent. Given a 4 percent prevailing rate of in ation and a coe cient of 2.5 on in ation outside the zone of opportunism, the in ation penalty equals 5 = 6 . Thus, the overall nominal interest rate of 6-5 = 6 percent makes allowance of 2 percentage points for the real rate, 4 percentage points for in ation, and 5 = 6 percentage point for the in ation penalty.
Despite the fact that the initial short-term rate is nearly as high under the opportunist as it is under the Taylor-style policymaker, the opportunist endures a much smaller recession because the agents in both the bond and labor markets look ahead and correctly anticipate that in the absence of further shocks the opportunistic policymaker will adopt an easier policy stance in the future. In ation declines considerably less rapidly under opportunism than under either of the conventional policies; indeed, in ation under the opportunistic policy reaches the 3 percent level only after 7 years. On the other hand, the cumulative output loss under the opportunist during that period is much smaller.
Thus, given our parameterization of these rules, the opportunistic policymaker tolerates more in ation than does either Taylor's policymaker or Henderson and McKibbin's. In return, the opportunist enjoys an economy that operates closer to potential. No one policy dominates the other two for all possible preference orderings over in ation and output.
Disin ation with favorable supply shocks: a rst scenario
In Figure 3 , we again assume an initial in ation rate of 4 percent (upper left panel). In this simulation, however, progress toward lower in ation is facilitated by a pair of favorable supply shocks. Speci cally, we assume that the shock to the contracting equation, u 12;t , takes on negative values in each of the rst two quarters of the simulation.
Under the Taylor-style policy, in ation reaches 3 percent within a year. (Recall that, in the absence of shocks, the in ation rate reached 3 percent only after about three years.) Because the policymaker does not anticipate the favorable shocks, she induces a recession that is not much shallower than the one she provoked when there were no shocks. However, she eases up much more quickly than she did in the no-shock scenario, and by the end of the second year of the simulation, output is essentially back at potential. The results for the Henderson-McKibbin policymaker are remarkably similar to those for the Taylor policymaker in this scenario. Evidently, the greater aggressiveness in response to output gaps about o sets the greater sensitivity to in ation gaps, yielding about the same net policy stance.
Under the opportunistic policy, the pace of disin ation during the rst year of the simulation is very nearly as rapid as it is under either of the conventional policies. Once the disin ationary impetus from the shocks has disappeared, the in ation rate under the opportunistic rule attens out at about 2-1 = 2 percent. As was the case in the absence of shocks, the opportunistic policymaker su ers much smaller output losses than does either conventional policymaker.
4.3 Disin ation with favorable supply shocks: a second scenario Figure 4 examines a scenario in which in ation starts out at the upper end of the zone of opportunism. Two years into the simulation, the economy is hit with a pair of unanticipated favorable supply shocks. Thereafter, there are no shocks to the economy. In these circumstances, both the Henderson-McKibbin and Taylor-style policymakers drive output somewhat below potential before the shocks hit (see the middle panel) in order to bring the in ation rate down toward the long-run target. When the supply shocks hit, in ation actually falls below the long-run target, so these policymakers engineer a small boom in order to bring in ation back up to the long-run target. Eventually, the in ation rate converges to 2 percent, as expected.
Under this scenario, the opportunistic policymaker fares very well indeed. During the rst two years of the simulation, the opportunistic policymaker sets output only slightly below potential, and in ation creeps toward the long-run target at a snail's pace. 9 When the favorable supply shocks hit, they are (by design) just large enough to drop the in ation rate to the long-run target level of 2 percent. Throughout the simulation, the opportunistic policymaker holds output very close to potential, and yet achieves the desired disin ation.
9
This creeping would not occur if the simulation algorithm we use took explicit account of the variance of future shocks, and if agents expected the variance of future shocks to be zero.
In this case, the strategy of waiting for favorable shocks pays o handsomely: in ation is driven down to the long-run objective while output is held almost exactly at potential.
4.4 Rising in ation due to an adverse supply shock Figure 5 shows a scenario in which the three policymakers are not nearly as fortunate as they were in Figure 4 . Prior to the beginning of this scenario, the economy was in equilibrium, with output at potential and in ation at the central bank's long-run target of 2 percent. In the rst quarter of the simulation, however, a huge adverse in ation shock hits the economy|su cient to drive in ation up to 14 percent within four quarters. In response, both the Taylor-style and the Henderson-McKibbin-style policymakers raise the short-term nominal interest rate to about 20 percent. The increase in interest rates drives output down relative to potential; at its deepest point, four quarters into the simulation, the gap between actual and potential under these two policies reaches 3-1 = 2 percent. Thereafter, with the initial shock no longer exerting any direct in uence on the economy, interest rates begin to decline, in ation begins to subside, and output begins to recover, but the process is fairly protracted.
In this scenario, the opportunistic policymaker responds much more aggressively than does either the Taylor policymaker or the Henderson-McKibbin policymaker, because the adverse shock pushes in ation far above the upper boundary of the zone of opportunism. The nominal interest rate under the opportunistic rule peaks at 27 percent, and output dips more than 5 percent below potential. At rst, in ation declines slightly more rapidly than under either the Taylor rule or the Henderson-McKibbin rule, but later on less so. The skimpiness of the in ation-reduction reward to the opportunistic policymaker for enduring a considerably deeper recession partly re ects the very limited role of the output gap in determining the real contract wage. Nonetheless, this simulation demonstrates that under the right circumstances, the opportunist will be tougher than either of the conventional policymakers.
A recession
We complete this set of illustrative scenarios by considering the impact of an unanticipated shortfall in aggregate demand. Speci cally, we assume an initial position of 4 percent in ation, and we induce a recession by feeding a sequence of two negative shocks to the equation for xed investment. 10 Figure 6 summarizes the results.
Like her other two colleagues, the Taylor-style policymaker fails to anticipate that the economy is about to plunge into recession. Accordingly, she sets the short-term interest rate in the rst period as high as she did in the simulations summarized in Figures 2 and  3|high enough, indeed, to induce some disin ation even in the absence of any shocks. Once she recognizes the occurrence of the negative demand shocks, however, the Taylorstyle policymaker cuts the short-term nominal interest rate quite rapidly. Even so, the ensuing recession is substantially deeper than it was in the no-shock scenario: After two quarters, output is more than 3 percent below potential. 11 Not surprisingly, in ation comes down more quickly than in the no-shock scenario; by two years into the simulation, in ation has declined to 2.9 percent, compared with 3.2 percent in the no-shock scenario. Once the negative demand shocks are no longer hitting the economy and the easier stance of monetary policy has begun to take e ect, output recovers fairly rapidly, and by the end of the second year of the simulation, the recovery is essentially complete. In ation nonetheless continues on a downward trajectory, mainly re ecting the momentum of the expectations mechanism.
Under the Henderson-McKibbin rule, the adverse impact of the recession on output is met with an aggressive reduction in the short-term nominal interest rate. As a result, the early phase of the recession is a bit less severe than under Taylor's rule. The relatively small di erences between the output paths under the two conventional rules translate into minute discrepancies between in ation trajectories, especially in the early years of the simulation.
10
Note that these illustrative shocks have a greater impact on in ation than the average demand shock based on the estimated model. There are two reasons for this, namely that the shocks are for two consecutive quarters (whereas our estimated shocks are uncorrelated), and that the shocks are to xed investment { the type of demand shock with the greatest impact on in ation in the model.
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Relative to historical experience in the United States, this is a mild recession. The output gap at the depth of the 1982 recession was about 8 percent.
On the whole, the Henderson-McKibbin policymaker appears to have achieved a relatively favorable tradeo in this simulation between output stabilization and in ation stabilization.
The opportunistic policymaker responds to the onset of the recession as vigorously in terms of the short-term nominal rate as does the Henderson-McKibbin policymaker. In terms of the short-term real rate, her response is markedly more vigorous, because in ation declines under the opportunistic rule at a more pedestrian pace. The output gap under the opportunistic rule is smaller than under either conventional rule, but at least to the naked eye the gain in output stabilization looks relatively meager compared to the loss in in ation reduction, especially compared to the experience of the Henderson-McKibbin policymaker.
Transition and stabilization in a stochastic economy
Under either conventional monetary policy rule, the model we have been working with is linear. Therefore, given an initial level of in ation (say 4 percent), it would be straightforward with either of these rules to calculate the expected time until in ation is within some neighborhood of the long-run target. In fact, the calculation could be done exactly as in Figure 2 , by setting all future shocks equal to their expected value of zero and simulating the model. In contrast, the model under the opportunistic policy rule is not linear, so the same \certainty equivalence" approach to calculating the expected time to arrival at some particular level of in ation cannot be taken.
We answer this question by conducting stochastic simulations. In preparation for those simulations, we rst computed the structural residuals of the model presented in Section 3 based on U.S. data from 1980 to 1993. 12 Then we calculated the covariance matrix of those structural residuals. Using this covariance matrix, we generated arti cial normallydistributed shocks and conducted 1,000 stochastic simulations of the opportunistic policy rule. 13 After each simulation, we recorded the time until in ation was brought within some 12 The process of calculating the structural residuals would be straightforward if the model in question were a purely backward-looking model. For a rational expectations model, however, structural residuals can be computed only by simulating the full model based on historical data. The structural shocks di er from the estimated residuals to the extent of agents' forecast errors. 13 For the linear rules we conducted 10,000 simulations to check whether the mean of the stochastic neighborhood of the long-run in ation target. Then, as shown in section 5.1, we calculated the distribution of these arrival times. We use the same general methodology in section 5.2 to determine the distributions of in ation and output in the stochastic steady state. In section 5.3 we show the relative e ciency of the alternative rules in reducing the volatility of in ation and output.
Time to disin ation
The upper panels of Figure 7 show the probability distributions of the time taken to disinate from 4 percent to 3 percent under each of the three monetary policy rules we have been studying. The horizontal axis indicates the number of quarters taken to reach an in ation rate of 3 percent (left panel) or 2 percent (right panel). The probability densities shown are smoothed versions of the discrete distributions generated by the simulations.
The densities to reach 3 percent in ation have modes at about 10 quarters for all three models. The Henderson-McKibbin rule has the greatest concentration of probability mass around the 10-quarter mark, with the Taylor rule not far behind. As expected, the opportunist policymaker acts more leisurely to bring in ation down to 3 percent{not only is the mode number of quarters slightly higher, but the upper tail of the distribution for opportunism has more probability mass than in the case of the alternative rules. In the upper right panel, the distribution of the time taken to disin ate from 4 percent to 2 percent has a mode of about 15-20 quarters, with opportunism again having a fatter upper tail.
The lower right panel shows the average (or expected) path of in ation for each rule. As shown, the expected path of disin ation under opportunism is noticeably slower than under the other rules. To reach an in ation rate of 3 percent, the expected time is about ve years, while for the other two rules it is a bit less than three years. 14 The lower right panel plots the expected cumulative sum of the output gaps for each rule. As shown, at each point in time the output loss is slightly smaller for the opportunistic rule than for the simulations converged to the deterministic \zero shock" path. Convergence was achieved.
conventional rules. The vertical dotted lines match those in the lower left panel, indicating when each rule achieves an in ation rate of three percent. At those times, the output loss (and therefore the sacri ce ratio) is about the same for all three rules. 15
Stochastic steady-state distributions of output and in ation gaps
A separate issue of interest concerns the distributions of in ation and output in the stochastic steady state. Our earlier analysis suggests that the distribution of the output gap should have more mass around zero under opportunism, and that the in ation distribution should be more di use within the opportunistic range, though not necessarily more di use outside that range. Our objective in this set of simulations is to verify that analysis, and to quantify the tradeo s available to the policymaker. Figure 8 presents density distributions in which there are only supply shocks (left panels) and only demand shocks (right panels). 16 For each type of shock, the distribution of in ation is shown in the top panel and the distribution of the output gap in the lower panel. The supply shocks reveal the dominant feature of opportunism most clearly{opportunism lets in ation vary from its long-run target more than do the other rules. But also, the distribution of in ation under opportunism is not a normal distribution{even though the shocks are normally distributed. Near the long-run target, the in ation distribution is atter than a normal distribution because, when in ation is in the opportunistic region, the opportunistic policymaker does not actively try to bring in ation back to target. Rather, she attempts to keep output at potential, as shown in the lower left panel by the concentration of probability at the output gap at zero. The conventional rules keep in ation more tightly concentrated about its target, but at the expense of a wider distribution for output.
As shown in the right panels of Figure 8 , the distributions derived with demand shocks
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Of course this need not be the case in a model with rational expectations such as the one employed here. Rather in such models the sacri ce ratio depends on the policy rule speci cation as well as other structural parameters. Consequently, the convenient similarity observed here may be sensitive to the speci c parameter values.
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The densities under opportunism are based on 1,000 stochastic simulations of the nonlinear model, while the unconditional standard deviations under the linear rules are computed analytically using the method developed Swamy and Tinsley (1980) . Since the shocks are drawn from a normal distribution and the model with the conventional rules is linear, the unconditional distributions of in ation and output are also normal. di er less across alternative rules than do the distributions of supply shocks. In particular, demand shocks do not have much e ect on in ation under any rule. The more aggressive Henderson-McKibbin rule clearly dominates the Taylor rule with respect to output and in ation stabilization. The former rule is the more appropriate reference point for opportunism because it responds in the same way to output gaps. Opportunism has a somewhat wider distribution of in ation than the Henderson-McKibbin rule and only a slightly narrower one for output.
The reason why the outcomes with demand shocks do not look that much di erent across the policy rules while those with supply shocks do is examined in Figure 9 . The upper left panel shows the response of the output gap over time to a temporary, stimulative demand shock, while the upper right panel is the response of in ation to the same shock. 17 The simulation exhibits two surprising properties. The rst one is that even though output is pushed one percent above potential, there is very little in ationary impact { in ation goes up by little more than one-tenth of a percentage point under all rules. The second reason is that the conventional rules do not need to create much of a shortfall in output to return in ation to target. Instead, they return output to potential nearly as fast as does the opportunistic rule, with little need to overshoot. Part of the reason for the small in ationary impact of temporary increases in output is the weak response of the real contract wage to the output gap in the Fuhrer-Moore contract wage equation (12). More important however is the forward-looking nature of agents' expectations. In a purely backward-looking model, such as the model in Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) that is based on an accelerationist Phillips curve, an increase in in ation due to a temporary demand shock can only be o set by an output gap of the same size but opposite sign. This does not hold anymore in a model where expectations are formed in a forward-looking manner. In this case, wagesetters incorporate the policymaker's in ation target as well as long-run potential output in forming their expectations about future in ation and output. Consequently, they expect 17 Fixed investment is shocked by 0.25 percent (of output), which amounts to about two standard deviations.
in ation to return to target and output to return to potential. These expectations accelerate the return of in ation to target after a purely temporary output deviation, and reduce the need for opening up an output gap in order to bring in ation back.
As shown in the lower panels, the case is much di erent for temporary supply shocks (i.e., shocks to the contract wage equation). They have a direct and persistent e ect on in ation and leave the policymaker with the di cult problem of trading o in ation and output losses. The conventional policymakers drive output below potential. The opportunistic policymaker however keeps output at potential as long as in ation stays in the opportunistic zone.
In simulations with the mixture of supply and demand shocks re ecting those we estimate to have hit the U.S. economy over the past decade or so, the distributions of in ation and the output gap are as shown in Figure 10 . The e ect of supply shocks producing a more di use distribution of in ation under opportunism shows through in the upper panel. However, the \reward" to the opportunistic policymaker appears to be mild in that, as the lower panel shows, the distribution of the output gap about zero is only slightly more concentrated for her than it is for the Henderson-McKibbin policymaker. This is because most of the dispersion of the output gap under all rules occurs in response to demand shocks, and that dispersion is not much di erent under opportunism and the conventional policy rules (lower right panel of Figure 8 ).
Output and in ation variability tradeo s available to opportunistic and conventional policymakers
Having provided a detailed analysis of the properties of three speci cally parameterized policy rules, we systematically explore alternative parameterizations of these rules. To focus the discussion, we concentrate on a comparison of the variability of in ation and output in steady state. In the long run, the fundamental tradeo implicit in the choice among alternative policy rules is with regard to the relative variability between in ation and output. Within a class of policy rules, this tradeo can be illustrated by identifying the parameterizations of the rules which yield the best combinations of in ation and output variability|that is a frontier which identi es the smallest possible variability of in ation consistent with a given variability of output and vice versa. Throughout, we assume that the economy is hit with the demand and supply shocks from the distributions utilized in the simulations described in section 5.2. The solid line in Figure 11 shows the resulting in ation-output variability frontier, using the standard deviation as a measure of variability. Points on this line identify the best combinations of variability of in ation and output that are feasible within this class of rules provided no restriction is imposed on the choice of response parameters, 1 and 2 . For instance, it appears feasible in this model, to achieve a standard deviation of output as low as 0.6 percent consistent with a standard deviation of in ation of 1.2 percent. However, the policy response parameters 1 and 2 needed to achieve such outcomes are very large and imply policies with extremely volatile nominal interest rates. 19 Since, in practice, policy appears to indicate a preference towards low variability of interest rates, it is useful to construct variability frontiers restricted so that the implied interest rate variability not exceed certain bounds. Two such frontiers are shown in Figure 11 , corresponding to standard deviations for the nominal interest rate of 2 and 3 percent respectively. 20 Figure 11 also identi es the variability outcomes associated with alternative policy rules. As shown, the Taylor and the Henderson and McKibbin (HM) speci cations fall just within 18 The usefulness of comparing alternative policies in terms of such a frontier has been highlighted by Taylor (1994) and more recently by Fuhrer (1997) and Williams (1997) .
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The implied standard deviations of interest rates are in excess of 10 percent.
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By comparison, the standard deviation of the federal funds rate since the end of the non-borrowed reserves targeting period in 1982 has been 2.3 percent. the 2 and 3 percent restricted variability bounds respectively. 21 As can be seen, the restricted frontiers become quite at to the right of the two rules. For instance, with respect to the Henderson and McKibbin speci cation, conventional rules tolerating considerably larger variability of in ation but restricted to achieve comparably low interest rate variability, provide only a marginal reduction in the variability of output. Such rules correspond to a smaller in ation response coe cient, 2 , than the Henderson and McKibbin value of 1 but only a marginally higher output response coe cient, 1 .
This observation becomes particularly relevant for comparing the Henderson and McKibbin speci cation with with our baseline speci cation of the opportunistic rule (Opp). As can be seen, measured in terms of standard deviations, the opportunistic rule yields about the same variability of output as the Henderson and McKibbin speci cation but greater variability of in ation. In our benchmark, the opportunistic rule has the same output response coe cient as the Henderson and McKibbin speci cation but assigns no penalty to in ation deviations from target within the opportunistic region. Over this region, therefore, the opportunistic rule resembles a conventional rule with a smaller in ation response coe cient which, as indicated above would be expected to yield about the same standard deviation of output as the Henderson and McKibbin speci cation but a larger standard deviation of in ation. Although the penalty is proportionally more severe than the one corresponding to the Henderson and McKibbin speci cation when in ation deviates substantially from the target, this e ect is re ected mainly in the higher moments of the distribution of in ation (as negative excess kurtosis).
Next we turn to the three variants of the opportunistic rule brie y described in section 2. In all three cases, we modify the policy reaction function by considering alternative responses to in ation but leaving the response to output unchanged (and equal to the response in the Henderson and McKibbin speci cation). The rst variant, recognizes that an opportunistic policymaker who does not control aggregate demand perfectly (as is indeed the case in 21 Indeed, the implied interest rate variabilities for the two rules are 1.9 and 2.8 percent, and both rules would be on the corresponding restricted frontiers. practice), will be sensitive to deviations of in ation from the intermediate target even when in ation is inside the opportunistic region. The extent of this sensitivity is determined, in part, by the degree of uncertainty faced by the policymaker and is di cult to quantify in practice. Qualitatively, however, the e ect is a policy reaction function with some slope inside the opportunistic region but greater slope outside the region. The rule corresponding to the point denoted as Opp B in Figure 11 assumes an in ation response similar to the one corresponding to the Taylor speci cation of 0.5 inside the opportunistic region but the same response as our baseline speci cation of the opportunistic policy outside the region. The result is to steepen, on net, the response of policy to in ation which as shown in the Figure reduces the standard deviation of in ation while leaving the standard deviation of output essentially unchanged.
The other two variants of policies we examine employ the same in ation penalty functions corresponding to the two variants of opportunistic policies but with a xed inaction zone. Such policies, essentially describe policy makers who actively pursue in ation stabilization when in ation falls outside a target zone but allow for exibility towards short run output stabilization when in ation is within the target zone. 22 With our parameterization, in these two variants we e ectively model a policy rule with an in ation target zone two percentage points wide. Such a policy di ers importantly from an opportunistic policy when in ation is above the target zone. In that case, the in ation target zone policymaker will appear more similar to a conventional policymaker as she will deliberately disin ate regardless of the recent history of in ation, whereas an opportunistic policy maker would tend to wait for favorable disin ation shocks. Fundamentally, however, in ation zone targeting exhibits an asymmetric response to shocks when in ation is close to its long run target which is inconsistent with conventional policy rules. 23 22 Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) identify the desire for this exibility as an important reason why most central banks associated with \in ation targeting" specify a range rather than a point target.
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That is to say, a policymaker with an in ation zone target of one to three percent, may appear to behave like a conventional policymaker with a target of three percent as long as in ation exceeds three percent. It would be incorrect and obviously quite misleading to employ a conventional policy reaction function with a target of three to describe the steady state properties associated with such an in ation zone targeting regime.
The e ect of shifting from an opportunistic in ation penalty to an in ation zone targeting one represents, on net, a more vigorous response of policy to in ation deviations from the long run target. In Figure 11 the points labeled Zone and Zone B indicate the standard deviations of the two policies, corresponding respectively, to a at and a sloped penalty inside the in ation zone. As shown this reduces the standard deviation of in ation but also raises slightly the standard deviation of output.
Conclusion
Broadly speaking, the results of this paper can be summarized as follows: First, we nd that disin ation under an opportunistic rule proceeds more slowly, on average, than under a conventional linear rule. At the same time, however, output losses along the way toward meeting the in ation target are commensurately smaller. On balance, the sacri ce ratio is about the same for the opportunist as it is for the conventional policymaker.
Second, once the steady state has been achieved, the relative experience of the opportunist compared to the conventionalist depends greatly on the distribution of shocks. In the wake of supply shocks, the distribution of the output gap is substantially more concentrated if the opportunist is at the monetary helm than if the conventionalist is in charge; on the other hand, the distribution of in ation around the long-run target is more di use. In the wake of demand shocks, the opportunist gains little in terms of output stabilization, given our model of the economy, while su ering some increase in in ation dispersion.
When we simulate the model with both demand and supply shocks, we nd that the resulting steady-state in ation distribution is somewhat more di use under the opportunistic rule than it is under the conventional rule, while the distribution of the output gap is about the same. This result makes sense because our model estimates imply that the bulk of the variation in output during the 1980s and 1990s mainly derived from demand shocks, while the bulk of the variation in in ation re ected supply shocks. As a result, the combined distribution for in ation to a close approximation can be inferred from the supply-shocks-only simulations, while the combined distribution for the output gap can be inferred from the demand-shocks-only simulations.
Third, we examine the e ciency of in ation targeting compared to both the conventional and opportunistic policy rules in stabilizing output and in ation. We nd that, for the parameterizations we explore, the in ation \zoner" falls about midway between the conventionalist and the opportunist: He achieves about the same degree of output stabilization as does either alternative, and fares somewhat better on the in ation front than the opportunist, though somewhat worse than the conventionalist.
Finally, we emphasize that our results shed no light on the issue of whether an opportunistic policy is as credible as a conventional policy: In every simulation we conduct here, private-sector agents are assumed to know both the speci cation and the parameterization of the monetary policy rule, and are assumed to believe that it will remain in force in perpetuity. A separate question, worthy of future study, is whether an opportunistic policymaker might su er from credibility problems because|under certain circumstances|she is observed failing to take anti-in ationary actions even when in ation remains above her long-run target. Note: The dotted and dashed straight lines depict the interest rate penalty levied by conventional policy rules with slopes 0.5 and 1, respectively. The piecewise linear solid line describes the penalty levied by the opportunistic rule. The at segment of the latter schedule corresponds to what we refer to in the text as the \opportunistic region," in which the monetary authority aims to hold output at potential. The penalty slope outside this region equals 2.5. Note: The graph plots the standard deviation of in ation and the output gap corresponding to the alternative policy rules. The three lines indicate frontiers of outcomes for these standard deviations obtained by simulating the conventional rule with varying weights on the in ation and output. The solid line indicates the unconstrained frontier. The two dotted lines show frontiers constrained by policies for which the standard deviation of the federal funds rates is at most 2% and 3% respectively.
